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Abstract: The failure of Operation 
Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, has partially 
been attributed to the failure of the 
RAF to provide the bomber support 
needed to support the landings. 
This fallacious argument, based on 
hindsight and a lack of understanding 
of the RAF’s capabilities at this 
point in the war, requires revision. 
This article examines the doctrinal 
and operational context of the RAF 
forces involved in Jubilee. Prewar 
combined operations doctrine stated 
that the key role for air power was 
the maintenance of air superiority. 
The absence of heavy bombers at 
Dieppe did not doom the operation. 
The RAF contributed significantly to 
the operation by seeking to battle 
the Luftwaffe in the manner that 
it did during Jubilee, and as such, 
it provided the most appropriate 
protection that it could for the assault 
forces.
Operation Jubilee,  the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, 
maintains a specific place in Canada’s 
cultural memory of the Second World 
War. Charles Stacey, the Canadian 
army official historian, stated in 
1948 that, “The raid on Dieppe was 
perhaps the most hotly-discussed 
operation of the war.”1 The debate 
over Dieppe is best represented by 
the duologue between Brian Loring 
Villa and Peter Henshaw over the 
role of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten and the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee in the authorisation of 
Jubilee, which came to fruition in 
the pages of The Canadian Historical 
Review in 1998.2
The debates over Jubilee can 
be transplanted onto the role of the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) in the raid. 
Villa has argued that, “There was a 
degree of callousness in [Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Charles] Portal’s [chief 
of the air staff] allowing a largely 
Canadian force to go in without 
the bomber support they needed.”3 
This fallacious argument, based on 
hindsight and a lack of understanding 
of the RAF’s capability at this point 
in the war, requires revision. The 
historiography on Jubilee has failed 
to contextualise the RAF’s role in 
the raid. Accounts polarise between 
triumphalism or criticism of the RAF’s 
claims. Most fail to grasp the context 
in which the RAF launched the raid. 
The only work that examines the 
RAF’s experience remains Norman 
Franks’ narrative account, which fails 
to analyse key factors of the RAF’s 
performance.4 
This article examines the doctrinal 
and operational context of the RAF’s 
involvement in Jubilee and deals with 
the key question of lessons learnt. 
It contends that prewar combined 
operations doctrine argued that the 
key role for air power was to maintain 
air superiority in order to protect 
assaulting forces. It then considers 
this alongside the development of 
the offensive use of RAF Fighter 
Command in the period 1940-1942. 
In understanding the twin pillars of 
doctrine and operations, this article 
challenges the revisionist argument 
that the failure of the RAF to supply 
bombers doomed Jubilee. It argues 
that in actually seeking to battle the 
Luftwaffe in the manner that it did 
during Jubilee it provided the most 
appropriate protection that it could 
for the assault forces.
A Doctrinal Problem
In early June 1940, the Prime Minister Winston Churchill called for the 
“Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose me 
measures for a vigorous, enterprising 
and ceaseless offensive” against 
German held territory.5 Churchill 
believed that these operations would 
have strategic effect and the increasing 
size of the raids up to Jubilee 
illustrates their growing importance 
in British strategy. This led to the 
appointment of Lieutenant-General 
Alan Bourne (Royal Marines) as 
“Commander of Raiding Operations 
on coasts in enemy occupation and 
Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on 
Combined Operations” on 14 June 
1940.6 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger 
Keyes replaced Bourne on 17 July as 
director of Combined Operations, 
as Churchill believed Bourne would 
not question Admiralty orders that 
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RAF gun camera footage showing an attack 
on a German twin-engined aircraft, likely 
a Dornier DO 17, over Dieppe, 19 August 
1942. The footage a sequence, starting 
at the top, of the fighter approaching and 
then opening fire on the aircraft. In the final 
frame the German bomber has been hit in 
the starboard engine which begins to smoke. 
The fate of this aircraft is not known.
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undermined his position. Keyes 
founded Combined Operations 
Headquarters (COHQ) and led it 
until 27 October 1941 when the young 
and ambitious Captain Mountbatten 
replaced him. Keyes was replaced 
because of ongoing disputes with 
Churchill over the latter’s desire to re-
title his role as advisor to the Chiefs of 
Staff on Combined Operations. 
The focus on strategic aspects of 
Jubilee has led historians to ignore its 
doctrinal context. A consideration of 
the doctrine that informed operational 
decisions is useful in highlighting 
the context of the RAF’s decision to 
utilise a supporting force that was 
predicated on the use of fighters to 
fight for air superiority.
During the interwar period, the 
key question that vexed experts on 
combined operations was whether 
they could be successful in the face of 
opposing air power. In 1923, the RAF 
produced Air Staff Memorandum 
No.10, which noted that a combined 
operation against an enemy who 
had air superiority was “doomed 
to failure.”7 This did not mean that 
they considered combined operations 
impossible, quite the opposite. 
Throughout this period, the RAF 
considered its primary objective 
in combined operations as being 
the attainment of air superiority. 
For example, during the 16th Staff 
Course at the RAF Staff College in 
1938, Group Captain Ronald Graham 
noted in his lecture, “Introduction to 
Combined Operations,” that while 
the addition of air power to the 
pantheon of war had complicated 
the character of combined operations, 
“we should not allow the question of 
air opposition to obscure the value of 
the exercise.”8 
In 1919, Major-General Warren 
Hastings Anderson, commandant 
at the Army Staff College, noted in 
the first combined operations staff 
exercise following the First World 
War that in the future this form of 
operation had to take account of all 
three services. Anderson stressed 
that any new Manual of Combined 
Operations should take note of the 
“views and requirements” of the RAF 
who “must of course be included in 
it.”9 The importance of air superiority 
was enunciated as early as 1922, 
when Air Vice-Marshal John Higgins, 
director of training and staff duties, 
and the RAF representative on the 
Altham Committee, noted in a paper 
entitled “Some Aspects of Combined 
Operations in so far as they affect the 
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Royal Air Force,” that the primary 
role for the RAF was air superiority 
and aerial interdiction. The Altham 
Committee was formed as a joint 
service committee under the chair of 
Captain Edward Altham, Royal Navy 
in order to revise the 1913 edition of 
the Manual of Combined Operations. 
It evolved out of discussions at the 
Army Staff College and the formation 
of the Dawney Committee in 1920, 
which met to revise the relevant 
chapter on combined operations in 
the Army’s Field Service Regulations. 
The Altham Committee supervised 
the production of the Provisional 
1922 Manual of Combined Naval, 
Military and Air Operations that was 
formalised in 1925.10 Throughout 
the period, the Manual of Combined 
Operations remained a jointly authored 
publication produced under the 
auspices of the Admiralty. Higgins 
highlighted the RAF’s argument that 
it considered a combined operation 
as that between more than any one 
service. For the RAF the methods it 
employed in achieving air superiority 
were equally applicable to any form 
of “joint” operation.11 This broad 
view sat outside of the scope of 
the doctrine, which focussed on 
amphibious operations involving 
all three services due to the RN’s 
control of the manual’s production 
and publication. 
Air superiority remained the 
cornerstone of the Manual of Combined 
Operations throughout the interwar 
years. The manual was updated 
in 1922, 1925, 1931 and 1938. The 
RAF’s strategic doctrine of the 
period, AP 1300 The War Manual, 
defined air superiority as a “state 
of moral, physical and material 
superiority” over the enemy that 
would allow freedom of action.12 
This fluidic definition of the hubris 
of air superiority allowed a number 
of interpretations about how to 
attain this state during the interwar 
period. The historiography of the 
RAF’s development has stressed its 
focus on bombing as the means of 
achieving air superiority.13 This was 
not an infallible conclusion in an era 
of rapidly changing technological 
fortunes. In a lecture on “Air 
Warfare” in 1925, the commandant 
of the RAF Staff College, Air Vice-
Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, 
noted that three key methods existed, 
fighting in the air, bombardment, and 
destruction of means of production.14 
The 1925 Manual  o f  Combined 
Operations noted that air superiority 
could be achieved through the 
application of indirect air power 
through the destruction of enemy 
air forces, lines of communication, 
demoralisation of personnel and the 
civilian population, and destruction 
of material by bombing. Fighters 
were limited to providing direct air 
cover over the beachhead.15 By the 
time of the 1938 edition of the Manual 
of Combined Operations, it had become 
apparent that fighter aircraft should 
take on a greater range of operations. 
The provision of adequate fighter 
cover through the offensive use of 
fighter patrols became one of the 
three main uses of air power in 
support of combined operations, 
along with bombardment, and the 
provision of smoke screens. The 
increasing scope of the 1938 edition 
of the manual within the context of 
the changing technological landscape 
shows there had been an increasing 
realisation that fighters could take 
on offensive roles. In a lecture to the 
Army Staff College in 1938, Graham 
noted the increasing use of fighters 
but also stressed the problem of 
achieving air superiority without 
denuding the operation of surprise, 
which was considered vital.16 This 
issue would take on importance 
during the planning of Jubilee. 
By the outbreak of the Second 
World War, it was widely accepted 
that air superiority was a necessary 
pre-requisite for success in combined 
operations. Air Vice-Marshal Richard 
Peirse, deputy chief of the air staff 
(DCAS), noted in 1938 that, “One 
of the greatest difficulties in this 
form of operation will be the need 
for establishing a favourable air 
situation.”17 By the time of Jubilee 
operational experience proved this 
belief correct.
The Need for Air Superiority 
In the two years after the formation of COHQ there was little opportunity 
for the utilisation of air power in 
support of small-scale raiding 
operations. Not until Operation 
Archery, the British commando raid 
on Vaagso, Norway in December 
1941, did the first truly joint combined 
operation take place.18 A pattern was 
set during Archery that was based 
on the beliefs that underpinned 
RAF fighter pilots gather for a group 
photo after the Dieppe Raid.
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the Manual of Combined Operations, 
and had been illustrated through 
broader operational experience. 
Five fighter squadrons (long-range 
Bristol Beaufighters and Blenheims) 
and two squadrons of Handley Page 
Hampdens supported Archery. Their 
primary mission was to provide air 
superiority.
While the RAF lacked knowledge 
of raiding style combined operations, 
it did have experience in other forms 
of amphibious operations from the 
Norwegian Campaign, the Dunkirk 
evacuation and the Battle of Britain in 
1940 to reinforce its belief regarding 
the importance of air superiority. 
Norway illustrated the problem of 
conducting a combined operation at 
the end of long and insecure logistics 
tail. The RAF was unable to build up 
enough strength to support ground 
forces while the RN failed to provide 
adequate carrier air cover in the 
initial phase. The inability to establish 
forward air bases led Major-General 
Bernard Paget, the commander of a 
British force in Norway, to remark 
that “all the lessons of peacetime 
exercises” had been forgotten.19 The 
problem of building up air strength 
during a combined operation was 
considered in numerous exercises 
during the interwar period with 
few adequate solutions found.20 
Conversely, the Luftwaffe provided 
effective support in what has been 
described as the first modern joint 
campaign.21 
The nature of the counter air 
operations undertaken by the RAF 
during Operation Dynamo at Dunkirk 
earned it the unfortunate epithet 
of the “Royal Absent Force.”22 The 
operations were primarily concerned 
with providing air cover over the 
evacuation area utilising offensive 
operations. Seventy-five percent of 
operations conducted by the RAF 
during Dynamo consisted of fighter 
sweeps by large-scale formations 
from Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park’s 
No.11 Group. The success of the RAF 
aided the RN’s ability to withdraw 
forces and Admiral Bertram Ramsey 
signalled on 29 May that, “I am 
most grateful for your splendid 
cooperation. It alone has given us 
a chance of success.”23 Air Vice-
Marshal James Robb, deputy chief 
of combined operations, noted that 
Dynamo was a combined operation in 
reverse and that until the experience 
of Dynamo and Norway the use of 
air power in support of combined 
operations had been a theoretical 
concern based on beliefs. He noted 
that recent experience had proven 
those beliefs, suggesting that, “If the 
enemy has a powerful air force, we 
must prevent him somehow or other 
from interfering with our landing and 
our lines of communications.”24
The Battle of Britain highlighted 
the significance of air superiority 
in defeating a planned combined 
operation. While debate remains 
over the exact aims of the Luftwaffe’s 
air  campaign i t  i s  c lear  that 
preparations were made to invade. 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 
(OKW) planning documents clearly 
indicate that for Operation Seelöwe 
to succeed the Luftwaffe would have 
to wrest control of the air from the 
RAF. Hitler’s Führer Directive No.16 
made this the primary prerequisite 
of future operations while an OKW 
directive of 2 July concluded that the 
“Invasion of England is quite possible 
under certain conditions of which 
the most important is the gaining 
of air superiority.”25 The RAF noted 
that the initial phase of the battle 
would consist of attacks against 
airfields and factories in an attempt 
to bring Fighter Command to battle 
and attrite its strength supported 
this view.26 The RAF’s ability to 
hold off Luftwaffe attacks led to 
a shift in strategy towards attacks 
predicated on coercion. The RAF’s 
success illustrated that its interwar 
belief on the difficulty of gaining air 
superiority in face of first class air 
power had been prescient in the test 
of battle. This would prove important 
for Jubilee. 
In the aftermath of the Battle 
of Britain, RAF Fighter Command 
launched a strategic fighter offensive 
that sought to bring the Luftwaffe to 
battle and attrite its strength. This 
strategy of “leaning forward into 
Not visible over the beaches at Dunkirk in 1940, the army dubbed the RAF the “Royal 
Absent Force.” In fact, RAF operations to protect the beach and the Royal Navy from 
Luftwaffe attacks was conducted some distance from the battlefield and was a major 
factor in the success of the operation.  
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France” began as early as 21 
October 1940 when Park was 
ordered to take the offensive 
when weather and lack of 
enemy activity warranted it.27 
This strategy provided the 
operational context for RAF 
operations during Jubilee. Air 
Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, 
air officer commander-in-chief 
of Fighter Command, and the 
new head of No.11 Group, Air 
Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-
Mallory, vigorously pursued it 
throughout 1941 and 1942. 
Throughout 1941, Fighter 
Command sought to define 
its role as the RAF went from 
the defensive to the offensive. 
Operations in 1941 consisted 
primarily of Rodeo, Rhubarb 
and Circus operations. Circus 
operation made use of bombers 
o f  N o . 2  G r o u p ,  B o m b e r 
Command. These operations 
required effective co-operation 
between the two commands and, 
in early 1941, they were not always 
successful. From mid-1941 onwards, 
the fighter offensive took on greater 
strategic importance as it sought 
keep Luftwaffe forces away from the 
eastern front. Operations continued 
into 1942, and on 13 April Leigh-
Mallory was ordered:
(a) To pick targets right on the coast, 
and not try to penetrate.
(b) To carry out a proportion of…
operations without bombers at all, 
since the Hun [was] apparently ready 
to react even though no bombers 
[were] present.
(c) To employ large numbers of 
squadrons with a view to out-
numbering the Hun.28
This revised directive was based 
on the issue of wastage that had 
plagued the offensive in 1941 which 
led to Douglas’ operational policy 
being amended on 13 March 1942. 
Douglas was ordered to resume 
Circus operations and supplement 
these with fighter sweeps in order 
to attrite Luftwaffe strength, though 
he was to conserve strength where 
possible until the introduction of 
more effective aircraft.29 In 1941 and 
1942, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory 
faced the problem of balancing 
issues of technological change, which 
affected the question of wastage, and 
the strategic requirements of Fighter 
Command’s new role in the British 
war effort. This led to discussion on 
the applicability of the offensive. An 
exchange of views between Douglas 
and his senior air staff officer, Air 
Commodore Douglas Evill ,  in 
March 1941 saw Evill contend that 
Circus operations at the time were 
ineffective and should be curtailed 
or stopped until a new method 
was found for their employment.30 
However, Douglas argued that a 
curtailment of operations would 
not be advantageous, though he 
did agree that there was need for 
further training.31 While the offensive 
provided Fighter Command with 
the opportunity to “lean forward 
into France,” by mid-1942, it had 
been virtually stalemated 
due to the tactical advantage 
enjoyed by the Luftwaffe. When 
viewed in conjunction with 
an appreciation of combined 
o p e r a t i o n s  d o c t r i n e ,  t h e 
experience of 1941 and 1942 
and the orders issued to Leigh-
Mallory on 13 April provide the 
operational context for No.11 
Group’s operations over Dieppe. 
The experience reinforced the 
belief underpinning the RAF’s 
involvement in combined 
operations doctrine in the 
interwar years, the need for air 
superiority.
The RAF also participated 
in  training for  combined 
operat ions .  In  November 
1941, as the scale of combined 
operations increased, COHQ 
was provided with an air 
advisor in the form of Group 
Captain Alfred Willetts.32 It 
became clear to Mountbatten that 
there was a need to train the RAF 
in the requirements of combined 
operations and test the beliefs of 
interwar doctrine. Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Charles Portal, chief of the air 
staff, agreed. The director of plans, 
Air Commodore William Dickson, 
examined the issue with the view to 
posting a “competent” body of men 
to work with the RN and Army at 
COHQ.33 This group of officers would 
form the core of No.1441 Combined 
Operations Development Flight that 
was based at the Combined Training 
Centre at Inveraray. This unit tested 
problems that arose as air power 
began to be utilised in ever expanding 
roles by COHQ.34
Training of operational units 
in the RAF’s functional commands 
assumed even greater importance 
in 1942 as planning for large-scale 
operations took priority. On 16 
February Portal told Mountbatten 
that six squadrons were earmarked 
for training with the expeditionary 
force while the director of fighter 
operations, Air Commodore John 
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was the air 
officer commanding No.11 Group and as such was the 
air commander for the Dieppe operation.
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Whitworth-Jones, noted that 15 
squadrons were available for training. 
It was expected that the training 
regime of No.1441 Flight would 
mirror Fighter Command’s, as it was 
this command that would provide 
the bulk of forces for any operations. 
Bomber Command was expected to 
provide units from No.2 Group for 
training.35 
By 31 March, commands were 
ordered by the DCAS to, “press 
forward as rapidly as possible with 
training and preparation for combined 
operations.”36 Douglas was expected 
to provide units for training as well 
as supporting Army Co-Operation 
Command in the preparation of 
fighter-reconnaissance operations. 
Training fell into two categories of 
operations: air cover over the area of 
the operation and support of ground 
troops in the land phase of the 
battle.37 Air Marshal Arthur Harris, 
the head of Bomber Command, raised 
questions over the draft orders issued 
to Bomber Command. He replied to 
a letter from the vice-chief of the air 
Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred 
Freeman, in his usual acerbic tones 
when he described it as training for 
“hypothetical operations.”38 Despite 
Harris’ objection, by May 1942 
training for Combined Operations 
became a vital aspect of the functional 
commands’ commitments. DCAS 
informed Douglas on 1 May that his 
priorities were:
(a) The intensification of the day 
fighter offensive which calls for 
reinforcement of 11 Group with 
Spitfire squadrons.
(b) Maintenance of a proper state of 
readiness of squadrons ear-marked 
for operation “Region”
(c) The training of fighter squadrons 
in rotation in Combined Operation39
In the same month, No.239 Squadron 
was the first unit to go through the 
training at RAF Abbotsinch and 
would later serve during Jubilee. 
By the time of Jubilee, the RAF was 
prepared to provide the increasing 
support needed for the ever-larger 
raids being conducted by COHQ.
Planning and the 
Bombing Issue
The origins of Rutter/Jubilee lay in Anglo-American discussions 
in early 1942 to increase the scale and 
frequency of raids.40 On 18 April, the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee approved 
a memorandum that stated that raids 
were “to be undertaken in the summer 
of 1942 on the largest scale that the 
available equipment will permit.”41 
These discussions fell under the 
larger hubris of decisions concerning 
Operation Sledgehammer/Roundup 
and the debate over the invasion of 
Europe in 1942. It had a clear impact 
on the RAF because as combined 
operations increased in scale they 
would require greater air support. 
This increase had the advantage 
of allowing Fighter Command to 
continue its policy of offensive air 
operations against the Luftwaffe as 
outlined in the air staff’s directive to 
Douglas on 13 March.
The first consideration of Dieppe 
as a target for an operation occurred 
at a meeting of the Target Committee 
of COHQ on 3 April.42 From here, 
an outline plan was produced and 
Mountbatten received approval for 
Rutter on 13 May.43 The plan that 
emerged envisaged a frontal assault 
on Dieppe proceeded by bombing 
of the town and airborne assaults 
on the gun positions on headlands 
overlooking the town.44 By the time 
the final air plan for Rutter emerged 
the bombing of Dieppe itself had 
been removed, and by the time of 
Jubilee the use of airborne forces had 
been replaced by commando assaults 
from the sea. As early as 14 April, 
Willets, Mountbatten’s air advisor 
on combined operations, questioned 
the use of airborne troops.45 However, 
Major-General Frederick Browning, 
commander of Britain’s airborne 
forces, lobbied for their use.46 The 
key issue related to the allocation 
of transport squadrons equipped 
with bombers that could be used 
in on-going Bomber Command 
operations. For example, on 11 May 
Harris requested that Nos.12 and 142 
Squadrons be given over to Bomber 
Command for use in Operation 
Millennium, the thousand bomber 
raid on Cologne on the night of 
30/31 May 1942. While not used, it 
highlights the problems facing the 
Pilots from No.401 RCAF Squadron rest 
between sorties, 19 August 1942.
Ca
na
di
an
 F
or
ce
s 
Ph
ot
o 
PL
 1
06
27
7
: “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
23
airborne force in 1942. The problems 
of allocating transport squadrons 
reduced the commitment of the 
airborne division to one battalion by 
1 June. 
The final air plan for Rutter 
visualized five key roles for the 
RAF; diversionary night bombing, 
the transport of airborne troops, air 
cover, reconnaissance and direct air 
support.47 It was expected that 110 
bombing sorties would take place 
as a diversion against Boulogne and 
two other undecided targets.48 After 
Exercise Yukon II, it was decided 
that Rutter would take place on 4 
July, however, prevailing weather 
conditions led to its postponement 
and eventual cancellation after 8 
July. The debate over the decision to 
remount the operation has been well 
documented.49 However, by 14 July 
the operation had been resurrected as 
Jubilee.50 It is clear that Leigh-Mallory 
was supportive of any decision 
to remount Rutter.51 The revised 
Jubilee air plan saw the RAF focus 
on providing air cover with direct 
air support a secondary priority. 
These operations continued through 
the daylight hours with the most 
intensive periods coming during the 
landing and withdrawal. Low-level 
fighter and bomber attacks supported 
assault forces and provided smoke-
laying where appropriate. Aircraft 
from Army Co-Operation Command 
provided tactical reconnaissance 
within the battle area and along 
the lines of approach to Dieppe.52 
While Dieppe was not bombed, a 
diversionary raid remained part of 
the plan with aircraft from the US 8th 
Army Air Force attacking the airfield 
at Abbeville, a purely military target. 
Command and control was provided 
through No.11 Group Headquarters 
at RAF Uxbridge. The headquarters 
ships HM Ships Calpe and Fernie 
provided control of close support 
aircraft with links to Leigh-Mallory 
at Uxbridge; Air Commodore Cole on 
the Calpe represented Leigh-Mallory. 
Cole was instructed to liaise with the 
other force commanders and direct 
low-level operations. 
During the course of the raid, 
the RAF provided constant air 
cover with operations split into five 
phases starting at 0445 hours and 
finishing at 2245 hours. In total, 70 
RAF squadrons and four US Eighth 
Army Air Force squadrons were 
tasked to support Jubilee. The first 
phase, 0445 hours to 0550 hours, saw 
attacks on the beaches and defences 
with Douglas Bostons laying smoke 
while escorted bombers attacked the 
beach front. Wing Commander G.C. 
Surplice of No.226 Squadron flew one 
of the first smoke laying operations 
of the day and reported taking off 
in the dark and encountering light 
anti-aircraft fire during the operation. 
His aircraft was attacked by a Focke-
Wulf FW190, which his gunner, Pilot 
Officer L.J. Longhurst, claimed as it 
turned away with smoke pouring 
from its engine.53 At the same time 
Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers 
and Supermarine Spitfires attacked 
gun batteries on the flanks, which 
were assaulted by Nos.3 and 4 
Commando. In the second phase, 
0550 hours to 0730 hours, air cover 
and ad hoc direct support were 
provided. For example, at 0645 hours, 
No.88 Squadron provided support to 
the Royal Regiment of Canada that 
was being held up at Puys on Blue 
Beach. The third phase, 0730 hours to 
1030 hours, saw the RAF tasked with 
providing air cover for operations 
on the ground. This was the greatest 
period of activity for the RAF with “20 
to 30 fighters being constantly in the 
area.” The penultimate phase, 1030 
hours to 1410 hours, saw the RAF 
continue to provide air cover while 
the withdrawal from the beaches was 
undertaken. Additionally, limited 
direct air support was provided for 
the withdrawing forces. During this 
phase Luftwaffe tactics against the 
attacking forces changed with larger 
mixed formations of fighters, fighter-
bombers and bombers being utilized. 
The final phase, 1410 hours to 2245 
hours, saw air cover provided for the 
fleet returning to the UK.54 
The operation cost the RAF 108 
aircraft while Luftwaffe records 
show that their losses totalled no 
more than 48 aircraft with the loss 
of 21 fighter pilots.55 However, it 
was initially assumed that RAF and 
A Spitfire from a Canadian squadron is 
refuelled following a sortie to Dieppe, 
19 August 1942.
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Luftwaffe losses were even. At a War 
Cabinet meeting on 22 August the 
foreign secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, 
described the Luftwaffe as having 
been roughly handled.56 Leigh-
Mallory claimed that “Reports since 
received indicate that the German 
Air Force…lost between 150 and 
200 aircraft.”57 Despite this apparent 
discord between Leigh-Mallory’s 
claim and the actual records, the key 
indicator of the RAF’s relative success 
on the day relates to pilot losses. 
Of RAF losses, 33 percent of pilots 
were classified as safe.58 This means 
that they were picked up either by 
friendly craft or by the air/sea rescue 
(ASR) organisation. Leigh-Mallory 
in his covering letter to his report 
to the secretary of state for air on 
Jubilee praised the work of the ASR 
organisation and lamented the loss 
of several of the Dover station’s craft, 
which had been operating outside of 
the range of the air cover umbrella.59 
These were the last vessels to leave 
the battle area and some of the last 
missions performed by the RAF were 
to provide air cover for these vessels.60 
Additionally, another 13 percent 
of pilots were classified injured or 
wounded and able to be return to 
service. However, the Luftwaffe 
lost 38 percent of its fighter pilots as 
killed while another 29 percent were 
classified as missing.61 The Luftwaffe 
suffered an attrition of 67 percent, a 
rate that was unacceptable for the 
return that occurred during Jubilee. 
From 1942 onwards, there was a 
general decline in both the quality 
and quantity of German fighter 
pilots; therefore, a high attrition rate 
exacerbated the problem.62
Despite its relative success, the 
key criticism of the RAF’s planning 
for Jubilee lay in the decision to 
cancel the pre-bombardment that 
had been part of the initial outline 
plan for Operation Rutter. Villa 
has noted that, “Without heavy 
air bombardment, the disparity 
in fire-power proved fatal to the 
Canadian and British invaders.”63 
This fatalistic post-facto analysis has 
percolated into recent works with 
historian Robin Neillands writing 
that Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s 
decision to cancel the bombing, 
“fundamentally undermined the 
possibilities of success at Dieppe.”64 
While bomber support may have 
aided the attackers, the planners had 
to contend with considerations that 
would have ameliorated against its 
effectiveness. These considerations 
include the applicability of use of 
bombers to the raid and the issue of 
authorisation from the War Cabinet.
T h e  M a n u a l  o f  C o m b i n e d 
Operations contended that the use 
of bombing depended on, “the 
number of aircraft available and 
other operations required of them,” 
and that, “In most cases the general 
struggle for air superiority, local 
operations in defence of the landing 
against enemy aircraft, and spotting 
and reconnaissance duties will have 
prior claims.”65 In this light, the 
decision can be viewed as conforming 
to prescribed doctrine. The use 
of heavy bombers also faced the 
problem of denuding the operation 
of surprise. While this contention 
may appear as fallacious reasoning 
for what some have claimed was 
a poor operational decision, it was 
based on operational experience. 
The growing scale of raids in 1942 
had seen greater use of air power 
that had not always been successful. 
During Operation Chariot, the raid 
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on St. Nazaire on 28 March 1942, the 
use of bombers alerted the defenders 
to the approaching operation due to 
their peculiar bombing patterns and 
they failed to provide the planned 
diversion.66 The inclusion of bombers 
for Rutter was based on the insistence 
of the other services. On 21 April, 
it was accepted that the target 
would be Dieppe itself.67 Despite 
its initial inclusion in the planning 
for Rutter direct bombing of Dieppe 
was removed at the meeting on 5 
June. However, diversionary attacks 
remained an important element of 
air plans for both Rutter and Jubilee.
Direct bombing was removed 
for several reasons. First, the issue 
of surprise was paramount in Leigh-
Mallory’s reasoning. This was based 
on operational experience. Second, 
Harris noted that for operational 
reasons any attack would have to 
go in after morning twilight. Given 
the tight schedule of operations 
for Rutter, this would leave the 
bombers a window of five minutes 
for any operation.68 After the 
decision was taken to remount the 
operation as Jubilee Leigh-Mallory 
made this operational factor clear 
in an undated memorandum on 
“The Employment on Bombers” 
that was certainly circulated before 
the meeting at COHQ on 24 July 
despite Villa’s claim that this was 
produced in September 1943.69 Leigh-
Mallory made clear the difficulty 
of coordinating Bomber Command 
operations with the requirements of 
the operation.70 The primary aim of 
the RAF was to provide effective air 
cover, and battle the Luftwaffe for air 
superiority, and thus the appearance 
of bombers five minutes before the 
attack would cause problems.71 The 
concern of causing casualties to 
assaulting forces played a role in 
Leigh-Mallory decision making at 
the meeting on 5 June. Finally, a key 
issue facing planners was a standing 
order from the War Cabinet relating 
to the use of heavy bombers over 
occupied territory. Mountbatten had 
noted this issue in a meeting of the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee as early as 
13 May and it was fully explored in 
his appreciation for Rutter.72 
Even before the fall of France in 
June 1940, the War Cabinet laid down 
rules governing bombing in France. 
These were amended in July 1940 
to take account of the armistice and 
drew attention to the concerns raised 
over targets where civilian casualties 
could be incurred.73 Sir Archibald 
Sinclair, the secretary of state for 
air, directed that military objectives 
could be attacked in France. They 
included military forces, works and 
fortifications, establishments and 
depots, shipyards and factories, lines 
of communications and transport, 
and other objectives of military 
necessity. While this suggests that 
bombing could have been used 
to support Rutter/Jubilee it is the 
reference in paragraph 3 of the Annex, 
which highlights the complexity of 
the issues that hampered Bomber 
Command operations in this sphere. 
It noted that:
3. Bombardment by naval and air 
forces is to be confined to military 
objectives and must be subject to the 
following general principles:
(a) The intentional bombardment of 
civil populations as such is illegal.
(b) It must be possible to identify the 
objective.
(c) The attack must be made with 
reasonable care to avoid undue loss 
of civil life in the vicinity of the target.
(d) The provisions of Red Cross 
conventions are to be observed.74
This made Harris adamant that if 
Bomber Command was to be used 
then it had to be under conditions 
that fitted these considerations. Thus, 
cancelling the pre-bombardment 
made sense  g iven that  these 
conditions could not be guaranteed, 
and that it might risk the loss of 
surprise.
The bombing of targets in France 
was a sensitive political subject that 
affected the conduct of combined 
operations. The St. Nazaire raid 
highlighted the problem of accurate 
targeting in occupied-territory as 
cloud cover had abrogated the 
bombers’ effective use.75 It is clear 
that Churchill’s policy towards the 
bombing of France was guided by 
four key concerns. First, the fear of 
pushing the Vichy regime into the 
hands of Germany. Second, Churchill 
did not want to damage relations 
with the US who maintained links 
with Vichy having granted them 
full diplomatic recognition. Third, 
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Churchill had to maintain good 
relations with Charles de Gaulle and 
the Free French forces based in the 
UK. Finally, Churchill was politically 
sensitive to the issue of civilian 
casualties in occupied territory.76 The 
impact of the sinking of the French 
Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July 
1940 had strained relations between 
Britain and France and it remained an 
important element of Vichy responses 
to British actions.77 However, this did 
not mean that targets in France, both 
in Vichy and occupied-territory, 
could not be attacked. A complex 
relationship between the air staff, 
relevant operational commands, the 
War Cabinet and Churchill existed 
to debate the merits of attacking 
specific targets in occupied territory. 
For example, the Renault factory at 
Billancourt was attacked on 3 March 
1942. However, the operational 
conditions for this attack fit the 
conditions laid down by the War 
Cabinet.78 Often discussions over 
targets in France were protracted, as 
with the attack on the Schneider works 
at Le Creusot on 17 October 1942 that 
was first suggested on 9 April.79 
Even into 1944, Churchill remained 
concerned over attacking targets in 
France. One of the underlying issues 
concerning the Transportation Plan 
was civilian casualties. Churchill 
feared postwar retribution and it 
took the threat of General Dwight 
Eisenhower’s resignation to force 
through acceptance of the plan.80 
Despite this Churchill quipped at 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder 
on 3 May 1944 that, “You will smear 
Top left: An air photo of Dieppe taken 
during the battle. A large fire can 
be seen burning in a building on the 
seafront while other plumes of smoke 
are created by the burning landing craft 
on the beach.
Centre and bottom left: Scenes of the 
air battle over Dieppe: A twin-engined 
aircraft is photographed in its final 
seconds before it plunges into the sea; 
Lazy contrails trace the path of aircraft 
on a summer day.
Ca
na
di
an
 F
or
ce
s 
Ph
ot
o 
PM
R 
84
-3
76
Ca
na
di
an
 F
or
ce
s 
Ph
ot
o 
PM
R 
86
-2
62
Ca
na
di
an
 F
or
ce
s 
Ph
ot
o 
PM
R 
86
-2
88
11
: “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
27
the good name of the Royal Air 
Force across the world.”81 He also 
telegraphed Roosevelt on 7 May to 
express his, and the War Cabinets 
concern over what he described as the 
slaughter of French civilians.82
Additionally, the RAF lacked the 
capability to attack pinpoint targets at 
this stage of the war. The Butt Report 
of August 1941 made it clear that 
Bomber Command struggled to hit 
targets. Only one in three attacking 
aircraft hit within five miles of their 
objective.83 The problem of precision 
targeting had been identified as early 
as 11 October 1939 when Air Vice-
Marshal Arthur Conningham noted 
that his crews in No.4 Group were 
having difficulty locating targets at 
night.84 Bomber Command would 
adopt area bombing as it main 
mode of operation until greater 
scientific and navigational aids 
became available from 1942 onwards. 
Despite the problem of targeting, 
Dieppe had been previously been 
attacked, however, by the time of the 
raid it was considered an unsuitable 
target for the Bomber Command 
main force .  In  1943 ,  Bomber 
Command’s Operational Research 
Section produced an assessment that 
raised questions of the efficacy of the 
command’s use based on its available 
strength, effectiveness and nature of 
the target.85 Dieppe was considered 
a wasteful target given the force 
requirements required to attack 
it. This was a reasonable assertion 
given the aim of Bomber Command. 
While the use of heavy bombers 
in support of ground operations 
increased after 1943 they were 
not always beneficial; operational 
research reports questioned the 
efficacy of their use for anything 
other than morale reasons.86 Given 
the geography of Dieppe, it is hard 
to imagine what advantage the use of 
heavy bombers would have actually 
given the attackers.
Lessons Learnt
One of the key issues raised by Jubilee is that of whether the cost 
was worth the sacrifice. Mountbatten 
made rigorous attempts to defend 
the necessity of the raid up to his 
death. As late as 1974 he continued to 
argue in the pages of the Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institute (JRUSI) 
that Jubilee had been a necessary 
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An RAF Boston (with its bomb bay doors open) flies over the naval task force at Dieppe. At least one ship is 
in the process of laying a thick smoke screen to hide the vessels from German coastal batteries.
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precursor to Operation Overlord 
when he stated that countless lives 
were saved during Overlord because 
of the lessons learnt at Dieppe.87 
This post-facto defence of his own 
actions was undoubtedly born out 
the fact that, as his official biographer 
noted, Dieppe was one of the two 
great criticisms that blighted his 
career.88 Indeed, the text of the JRUSI 
article came from his address to 
the Canadian Dieppe Veterans and 
Prisoners of War Association on 28 
September 1973 where he sought to 
justify the reasons for the raid. It is 
clear that this was specious reasoning 
on the part of Mountbatten who tried 
to stretch the verity of his claims by 
ignoring other theatres of operation. 
The attempt to analyse lessons 
learnt from the operation began soon 
after with Captain John Hughes-
Hallett, the Jubilee naval force 
commander, supervising a quick 
post-mortem process that saw the 
production of a combined report 
on the operation and a separately 
p r o d u c e d  “ L e s s o n s  L e a r n t ” 
document. A key element of this 
document was the reports by the 
individual force commanders. Leigh-
Mallory submitted his report on 5 
September 1942. In his covering letter 
to Sir Archibald Sinclair, secretary of 
state for air, Leigh-Mallory outlined 
his view that in overall terms the 
operation had been a success from 
the perspective of the air force.89 
Leigh-Mallory praised the work 
of the squadrons providing air 
cover and noted that this “was 
the most satisfactory part of the 
Operation.” Notably Leigh-Mallory 
also praised the work of the air-sea 
rescue organisation that picked up 20 
pilots in the course of the operation.90 
Leigh-Mallory’s key concern related 
to the provision of adequate aerial 
recognition training for RN gunners 
who had posed serious problems of 
command and control (C2) for the 
system then in place. While Leigh-
Mallory praised the standard of work 
undertaken by his own controllers 
Top: The use of heavy bombers was cancelled for the attack on Dieppe, American heavy 
bombers were tasked with diversionary operations. Here, the crew of a US B-17 Flying 
Fortress, “Dixie Demo” leave their aircraft following their participation in Operation 
Jubilee.
Above: The air photo captures the explosion of bombs dropped by American B-17s on 
the German aerodrome at Abbeville/Drucat on 19 August 1942. Key to the annotations: 
A. Bombs bursting in the northern dispersal area; B. Bomb bursts in a dispersal area; C. 
Bomb bursts on the northern end of the NE/SW runway; D. Bomb bursts on the eastern 
end of the E/W runway; F. Bomb bursts on a light anti-aircraft position; H. Bomb bursts 
on a heavy anti-aircraft position; I. Bomb bursts on the outskirts of the aerodrome.
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on both Calpe and Fernie it is clear 
from the discussions both before 
and after the operation that this was 
a problem that had to be examined 
in order to fully apply air power in 
combined operations.91 Given the 
criticism in the historiography over 
bombing it is interesting to note that 
Leigh-Mallory’s comments on this 
subject were purely of an operational 
nature. He noted that bombing was 
not as useful as smoke laying in initial 
landing operations and that plans 
to utilise the light bombers of No.2 
Group to attack reinforcements had 
come to nothing due to the lack of 
German troop movement.92 
Overall, various reports on Jubilee 
highlighted three key conclusions on 
the RAF experience. First, combined 
operations could be used as a means 
of drawing the Luftwaffe to battle, 
thus, allowing Fighter Command 
to attrite its strength. Second, there 
was a need to improve the command 
and control (C2) functions which 
supported such operations. Finally, 
there was a significant attempt to 
address the utility of bombing as a 
means of supporting such operations. 
The “Lessons Learnt” report also 
highlighted concerns over the scale 
of operations, use of smoke, the 
use of airborne forces as well as the 
aforementioned issue of C2.93
Perhaps the least useful lesson 
learnt was Leigh-Mallory’s attempt to 
link the use of combined operations 
to an offensive fighter strategy; in 
effect, intruder-based operations 
using commandos as bait rather 
than bombers. This was not an 
unreasonable conclusion given that 
after Dieppe the Germans began 
reinforcing positions in France and 
Norway. Leigh-Mallory wrote to 
Mountbatten on 22 August stating 
that, “I feel that we might profitably 
conduct a future operation on rather 
different lines.” He saw the success of 
No.4 Commando’s operation against 
the Hess Battery as a blueprint for 
future operations.94 Two operations 
made it as far as the planning stage, 
Operations Aflame and Coleman. 
While there were advantages to this 
type of operation, it was ultimately a 
dead-end by late 1942 with prevailing 
operational issues such as the impact 
that weather would have on fighter 
operations and bombing accuracy.95 
However, in 1943 it received renewed 
vigour when Operation Starkey, 
a sham Brit ish and Canadian 
amphibious invasion in the Boulogne 
area of France, became an important 
element of Operation Cockade, a plan 
designed to pin down German forces 
in Western Europe.96 Key to this was 
the desire to bring the Luftwaffe 
to battle. Starkey was launched on 
16 August and culminated on 9 
September. It sought to feign the 
movement of a large number of 
troops and to deceive the Germans 
into believing that a major operation 
was to take place in the area of 
Boulogne.97 RAF Fighter Command 
supplied 72 squadrons that provided 
air cover and hoped to fight a major 
air battle using a RN force as bait. 
Ultimately, Starkey failed. It did 
have an impact on the planning for 
deception operations for Overlord, 
in particular Fortitude South, which 
was reconsidered in light of problems 
of conception that plagued Starkey. 
Deception had been at the core 
of these planned operations with 
Mountbatten claiming that Coleman 
would be the deception plan for 
Operation Torch.98 Starkey also began 
to change the attitude prevalent in 
the RAF that air superiority could 
be gained during the course of a 
combined operation. By Overlord, 
it was recognized that this was a 
prerequisite that would have to be 
gained beforehand. 
The force commanders in their 
individual reports that formed 
the Combined Report on Jubilee 
highlighted the question of C2.99 
The key experience revolved around 
the loss of HMS Berkeley, which 
was sunk by the Luftwaffe because 
of the RAF’s inability to engage 
below 3,000 feet for fear of friendly 
anti-aircraft fire from supporting 
RN destroyers.100 The problem of 
C2 at such an intimate level of 
operations had been highlighted in 
the interwar years when HMS Nelson 
had been used as a HQ ship during 
exercises off the Yorkshire coast 
in 1934.101 This was one of Leigh-
Mallory’s concerns after the debacle 
of Exercise Yukon II in preparation 
for Operation Rutter.102 This concern 
led Mountbatten to initiate an inter-
service committee to explore the issue 
in early 1942.103 The report led to the 
development of HMS Bulolo and 
Largs as headquarters ships, however 
they were not available for Jubilee 
and the attacking forces had to rely 
on adapted destroyers that were not 
sufficient for the job. Jubilee acted as a 
trigger for the extended development 
of the headquarters ship concept as it 
illustrated the dire need for specialist 
ships to serve in this role. This 
was reinforced by Bulolo’s success 
during Operation Torch. However, 
it was clear that the headquarters 
ships could not completely resolve 
the complicated issues of C2 for air 
operations. The ultimate result was 
the development of fighter direction 
tenders (FDTs) manned by specially 
trained fighter direction officers. 
FDTs were equipped with ground 
control intercept radar and the 
relevant intelligence streams to allow 
the control of fighter aircraft over the 
invasion area, a role that decreased 
pressure on headquarters ships, 
which took on a greater oversight 
role in 1944. This revised system 
would prove itself during Operation 
Overlord.104
The problem of fire support 
in combined operations was a key 
lesson identified by Hughes-Hallett 
who noted that the RAF part was 
of vital importance.105 Throughout 
late 1942, COHQ began studying the 
question of fire support through its 
Assault Committee, which simply 
stated that, “In all stages of the action 
all forms of air support would be an 
urgent requirement.”106 A technical 
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sub-committee was set-up to examine 
“Whether the requirements of fire 
support in assaults could be met by 
bombing, gunfire from ships, or a 
combination of both.”107 Despite the 
obvious need to examine the issue 
of aerial bombardment it was not 
dealt with in any meaningful manner 
until Leigh-Mallory raised the issue 
at Exercise Rattle in June 1943.108 
Leigh-Mallory’s personal experience 
of Jubilee clearly highlighted the 
importance of aerial bombardment 
to him. This line of experience in 
conjunction with reports emanating 
from the Mediterranean, in particular 
Operation Corkscrew, the invasion 
of the Italian island of Pantelleria, 
would form a vital  source of 
information in the planning for 
Overlord. Air Vice-Marshal Ronald 
Graham formed an inter-service 
committee under the auspices of 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee to 
examine the problem of fire support 
for amphibious operations. This 
committee submitted its report in 
early 1944 and it emphasised the need 
for the use of air power by noting 
that all action would be joint, and 
that the effort fell into three tasks: 
silencing coastal defences; drenching 
fire during the assault; and provision 
of support during the build up of the 
bridgehead.109 
Conclusion – 
Success or Failure?
It is clear that the debate over the effectiveness of the RAF during 
Jubilee remains contentious. A 
broader analysis of the context 
in which the RAF was operating 
highlights the idea that the RAF did 
indeed pursue the right strategy to 
support Jubilee. RAF strategy stressed 
the importance of air superiority and 
it was widely accepted that this 
was the overriding consideration 
in combined operations. A simple 
statistical analysis of losses does little 
but misunderstand the problems of 
supporting combined operations 
with offensive air power. Without 
air cover, Jubilee would have been an 
unmitigated disaster. Given that only 
one ship, HMS Berkeley, was lost due 
to bombing highlights its importance. 
Indeed, Hughes-Hallett wrote that 
“The fighter cover afforded by No.11 
Group was magnificent and the…loss 
of one ship…should be regarded as…
fortunate.”110 
Contemporary Canadian views 
highlight the complexity of the 
operation and lessons learnt by the 
RAF. Captain G.A. Browne of the 
Royal Canadian Artillery, who served 
as a forward observation officer, 
commented on the cancelling of the 
aerial bombardment to preserve the 
element of surprise that:
Further,  is  surprise easier to 
obtain, than the preparatory heavy 
air bombardment which in our 
case would quite probably have 
succeeded where surprise, or rather 
the hope of surprise, failed?111
In contrast Lieutenant J.E.R. Wood of 
the Royal Canadian Engineers, who 
was captured on Red/White beach, 
commented after the war that:
Some of our people later claimed 
they never saw the Air Force. Of 
course they didn’t. They were too 
busy up top keeping the Luftwaffe 
off us. I can truthfully say we were 
not machine gunned on that beach 
except by our own people after we’d 
folded up. That means the R.A.F. did 
its stuff.112
Conversely, the Luftwaffe’s 8th 
Abteilung wrote that the key lesson 
for the Allies lay in understanding 
that air supremacy was what was 
required in any future Combined 
Operation.113 This is what the RAF 
had been arguing since the early 
1920s.
W h i l e  t h e  W a r  C a b i n e t ’ s 
conclusion that  the “Support 
afforded by air forces was faultless” 
overstates the operation’s success, it 
is clear that the RAF considered their 
experience as positive and they did 
learn lessons from Jubilee.114 In line 
with developments from operations 
in the Mediterranean, attempts 
were made to integrate improved 
C2 systems for future combined 
operations. Additionally, scientific 
attempts were made to examine how 
bombing could be used to support 
operations. Jubilee acted as a trigger 
for developments that emerged 
in the course of 1943 and these 
improvements were evident during 
Operation Overlord. However, the 
path between failure at Dieppe and 
success on D-Day was not the direct 
line suggested by Mountbatten.
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